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China attracted a record $52.7 billion US dollars in foreign direct investment (FDI) in 
the year 2002, surpassing the US to become the world’s largest FDI recipient. China’s 
success in attracting FDI has received significant attention from academics. Several 
theoretical approaches have been developed to explain the determinants of FDI in China. 
However, it seems to be ignored that China has also become a growing provider of 
significant FDI to the rest the world. Both China and Vietnam were and are experiencing 
transitions from centrally planned economies to free market economies. This paper, 
therefore, attempts to explore the development of Chinese investment in Vietnam, 
analysing the main motives for, and characteristics of, Chinese MNEs investment in 
Vietnam. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In January 2003, the London based Financial Times reported that China attracted a record 
$52.7 billion US dollars in foreign direct investment (FDI) in the year 2002, surpassing 
the US to become the world’s largest FDI recipient. From zero in 1978 to over US$ 52 
billion in 2002, the compound rate of growth of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in 
China has been nearly 40 percent per year. This growth helped China achieve a 
remarkably high average growth rate of nearly 10 percent per annum from 1978 to 2002, 
which has allowed China to develop into one of the most dynamic economies in the 
world. This phenomenal development is impressive. China’s success in attracting FDI, 
and its utilization of this for domestic development since the adoption of the open door 
policy in the late 1970s, has received significant attention from academics. Several 
theoretical approaches have been developed to explain the determinants of FDI in China, 
such as market power, internalisation, international competitiveness and the production-
cycle model (Sun 1998, Wu 1999, Fu 2000).  The motivational factors supporting FDI in 
China that have been identified include the country’s high GDP growth rates, low work 
force costs, large market size (economic factors) and bamboo network (cultural factors).  
Chinese enterprises have benefited from this FDI in terms of technology transfers, 
improved management practices, and capital investment.  
 
However, it seems to be ignored that China has also become a growing provider 
of significant FDI to the rest the world. By the end of 2000, the total number of 
established Chinese firms totalled 6,298, with operations spanning 160 countries and 
investment volume reaching US$11.36 Billion (People’ Daily, 10/09/2001). At a global 
level, China’s offshore investment is still small, but significant growth potential clearly 
exists. 
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A number of competing and complementary theories have been proposed to 
explain the motivation of FDI. Among others, these include the neoclassical theory of 
capital mobility, Hymer (1976) ownership advantage, Buckley and Casson’s (1976) 
Internalisation theory, Dunning’s (1977,1979) eclectic theory, and Vernon’s (1966) the 
product life cycle theory. These theories will be applied to Chinese investment in 
Vietnam. Academics such as Wang (2002), Taylor (2002) and Cai (1999) have touched 
on this issue, but only generally addressed the motivations of Chinese MNEs to invest in 
other countries, particularly in developed nations, such as Australia, Canada, United 
States and Hong Kong SAR. Chinese investment in destinations such as Vietnam has not 
been examined by most academics. Both China and Vietnam were and are experiencing 
transitions from centrally planned economies to free market economies. This paper, 
therefore, attempts to explore the development of Chinese investment in Vietnam, 
analysing the main motives for, and characteristics of, Chinese MNEs investment in 
Vietnam. Two Chinese MNEs – China Luo Yang Floating Glass Corp. (CLFG) and 
China TCL Holdings Co. Ltd (TCL) have been selected as case studies for this paper. 
Information on the Chinese MNEs and their investment in Vietnam was collected during 
a field trip to China and Vietnam in 2002. Existing problems with these investments and 
future trends of Chinese outward investment in Vietnam will also be identified at the end 
of this paper. 
 
2. Overview of Chinese Foreign Direct Investment in Vietnam 
 
Since the normalisation of relations between China and Vietnam in the early 1990s, bi-
lateral economic, trade and political ties have developed rapidly. The volume of bilateral 
trade increased from US$ 32 million in 1991 to US$ 1,440 million in 1997, and by 2000, 
reached US $ 2,466 million, of which China’s export was US$1,537 million (an increase 
of 59.5%) and Vietnam’s export was US$929 million (an increase of 162.3%). By 
exploring investment opportunities more in a neighbouring market, these two transitional 
economies became important trading partners. The two governments have also signed 
numerous agreements for investment protection since the normalisation of relations. 
 
According to Chinese MOFTEC (now called Ministry of Commerce) statistics, by 
June 2002, China had invested in 59 projects in Vietnam, with contract volume totalling 
US$ 93.6 million (Chinese MOFTEC website). Based on Vietnamese Statistics, at the 
20th of December, 2002, China had invested in 196 projects in Vietnam with total capital 
reaching US$ 362.79 million dollars, with this investment ranking 18th among all the 
countries and territories (Vietnam Investment Review, Jan 13-19, 2003: p 20). The 
discrepancy between the Chinese and Vietnamese statistics can be accounted for by the 
large amounts of private capital transactions that cross the boarder into Vietnam.  These 
transactions do not show up in the Chinese official statistics but are accounted for in the 
Vietnamese figures. 
 
3. Two Cases of Chinese Investment in Vietnam 
 
 
Two Chinese MNEs – China Luoyang Floating Glass Corp. (CLFG) and China TCL 
Holdings Co. Ltd (TCL) have been selected as case studies for this paper. Both 
companies are large, state-owned manufacturing enterprises. However, they have very 
different backgrounds. China Luoyang Float Glass Group Co. Ltd.CLFGis the largest 
comprehensive glass manufacturer in China and the birthplace of "Luoyang Float 
Process" - one of three float processes in the world. Preparations were made for setting 
up the company in 1956. Today, after more than 40 years of development, CLFG 
possesses two affiliated companies, eleven majority-controlled sub-companies (excluding 
secondary majority-controlled companies), three share-holding sub-companies, and one 
collectivised sub company. CLFG has 12,000 employees and total assets of RMB 3.9 
billion (1 RMB = 0.121 USD) with net assets of 2.5 billion. China Luoyang Float Glass 
Group, with China Luoyang Float Glass Group Co. Ltd. appearing as its core, is not only 
one of 56 large-scale business groups of China selected for experimentation but is also 
one of the business groups whom are on a special list of the national planning. The 
Chinese government selected qualified, large state-owned enterprises (SOEs) for 
reforming experiments during the 1980s. The decision making power was then passed to 
the managers of these enterprises from the Chinese government. During the early period 
of transition from a centrally planned economy to a market economy, only a few SOEs 
had been selected. China Luoyang Glass Co. Ltd. - a majority-controlled sub company 
sponsored and created by CLFG, has consecutively listed H and A shares in Hong Kong 
and Shanghai, raising capitals of RMB 1,2 billion. This has allowed it to enter into 
financial markets both at home and abroad, and also has opened a new financing channel.  
 
In 1990, CLFG realised a wholesale agent from Guangxi province had a high 
demand for glass, typically consisting of ten train carriages per month, with additional 
special train arrangements for the shipment. After market investigation, CLFG discovered 
that all the products had been on-sold to Vietnam. Based on the information gathered 
from Guangxi province, CLFG decided to send a delegation to Vietnam for marketing 
research. The delegation interviewed different ministries officials, customers and local 
Vietnamese glass distributors, also collected data for the glass consumption in the 
different part of Vietnam. The research report showed that market demand in Vietnam for 
CLFG glass was very high, mainly from the construction industry. There was only one 
glass factory in Vietnam in 1990, with no foreign companies manufacturing in Vietnam. 
Thus, there was little competition at that time. The technologies used in Vietnam were far 
behind those used by CLFG. Based on the report, and the organization’s strategy, CLFG 
management decided to invest in Vietnam. 
  
Established in 1981, China TCL Holdings Co. Ltd., (TCL) is a comprehensive, 
large-scale, state-owned enterprise. It is engaged in business ranging from the R&D, 
manufacturing and sale of electronics and telecommunication products to that of 
information technology products. After a 20-year development, TCL has formed four 
series of products represented by TCL King brand colour television in the industries of 
audio-visual products, telecommunication, information appliance and electrical 
components. Moreover, the corporate strategy is positioned at hastening the enterprise 
developments by integrating audio and video products represented by King brand TV and 
mobile communication products represented by cell phone. TCL maintains a cutting edge 
 
by continuously enhancing its core competitiveness. Over the past 20 years, TCL has 
undergone a period of substantial development and it is also one of the fastest-growing 
major industry manufacturers, having recorded a compound annual growth rate of more 
than 50 percent in the last ten years. Today, all of its four pillar industries lead the market 
in their respective fields. As a whole, TCL is ranked sixth out of China’s 100 most 
prestigious electronics & IT enterprises. In 2001, TCL’s brand equity was valued at 
RMB14.4 billion, it’s total sales reached RMB 21.1 billion, and its export earnings came 
to US$716 million (nearly 40% higher than in 2000). In 1996, TCL acquired a Hong 
Kong based company. This company had a subsidiary in southern Vietnam (Dong Nai 
province) that manufactured TV’s, but due to a variety of reasons, this factory was 
nearing bankruptcy. After TCL founded an International Department, top management 
considered taking their first overseas venture into Vietnam. In November 1999, the first 
TCL coloured TV appeared in Vietnam. By the end of 2000, TCL Vietnam started 
making profits. The total sales of coloured TV’s in 2000 were 20,000 sets, and the total 
sales of VCD’s were a couple of thousand. The total profit in 2000 was $130,000 US 
dollars.  TCL achieved 8% of the colour TV market in 2001 and grew this to 16% (only 
1% behind the industry leader) by 2002, while total profit was a half million US dollars 
in 2001.  
 
4. Why Invest in Vietnam? 
 
There are some common motives for investment in Vietnam between TCL and Luo Yang 
Floating Glass. First, both companies were attracted to Vietnam’s large domestic market. 
Both TCL and CLFG simply followed their customers into Vietnam. They both had 
exporting large quantity of their products to Vietnam before they decided to invest there. 
For TCL and CLFG, Vietnam’s market size and economic growth were the main motives 
driving their investment. With a population of nearly 80 million, Vietnam adopted a free 
market economy in the later 1980’s. In the past fifteen years, GDP growth rate has 
averaged around 7%. CLFG’s main customer in Guangxi Province explored Vietnam’s 
glass market in early 1990s and found the neighbouring region in northern Vietnam had a 
great potential for construction industry. By following this Guangxi customer, CLFG was 
able to meet all the key officials in Vietnam. CLFG was easily able to enter Vietnam and 
establish their distribution network under the official Guan Xi (network). CLFG had an 
agreement with their Guangxi customer that CLFG would set up the new factory in 
Southern Vietnam and mainly target the southern and central market, while keeping the 
traditional northern market for their customer. In 1992, CLFG set up its joint venture 
Vietnam-China Long Jiang Glass Ltd in southern Vietnam province Bien Hoa. For TCL, 
its market entry into Vietnam was based on the purchase of a HK subsidiary that had set 
up its Vietnamese factories in 1995. Hong Kong’s financial location and its Vietnamese 
factory were the main reason for this acquisition. As the new owner of the Vietnamese 
factory, TCL simply renewed its contract with the Vietnamese government and entered 
the Vietnamese market. 
 
The second common motive is adapting to local tastes and needs from customers. 
When CLFG entered the Vietnamese market in 1992, the construction industry in 
Vietnam was booming. In terms of technologies and market economic experience in the 
 
glass industry, Vietnam was behind China As the main glass company in China, CLFG 
was technologically advanced in its manufacturing capabilities. Due to the different 
market needs and the boom of the construction industry in Vietnam, CLFG had to 
manufacture different products to cater for local tastes and needs. For example, in 
Vietnam’s construction industry in the early 1990s, there was a high demand for coloured 
glasses such a blue and “Tea” brown. While CLFG had the manufacturing capability to 
produce these products, the market demand for coloured glass in China had reduced 
significantly as these products were in the decline stage of the product lifecycle in the 
Chinese construction industry. Thus, CLFG shifted these machines and technologies as a 
capital investment to their joint venture in Vietnam. TCL also offered local TV products 
for the Vietnamese market. At this time, Vietnam still experienced shortages of electricity 
and didn’t have a broadcasting network or satellite technologies to cover some remote 
mountainous and rural parts of the country. Due to the different needs and tastes of local 
Vietnamese customers, TCL produced a “powerful receiver” coloured TV in Vietnam. In 
these regions, TCL TV’s provided much clearer reception than other brands. This is the 
main reason why TCL achieved a high market share within a couple of years after 
entering the Vietnamese market. During an interview with CLFG and TCL, both 
companies mentioned that a lack of knowledge of the local language and business 
customs of Vietnam was also another reason why they wanted to set up Vietnamese 
subsidiaries.  
 
Reducing transaction costs was another motivation for TCL and CLFG in setting 
up their Vietnamese subsidiaries. Vietnam had high tariffs for imported TVs and a local 
quota system that blocked TCL targeting the market directly. The Vietnamese 
government was under pressure from existing TV industry investors for protecting 
existing TV manufacturers in Vietnam. The government put hight tariffs on imported TV 
sets from overseas and used a quota system to protect the existing investors. The cost of 
import tariffs and the import quota significantly increased the transaction costs for TCL 
in Vietnam. As a result, TCL entered the country to avoid this cost. CLFG was an early 
bird in the Vietnamese market. The company didn’t face a tariff or quota system for 
importing glass for Vietnam’s construction industry. However, after the Boarder War and 
due to the political relationship between China and Vietnam, transportation costs between 
China and Vietnam were very high in the early 1990’s. By setting up a new production 
line in the local market, CLFG could save huge transportation costs and effectively target 
the Vietnamese market.   
 
Another set of common motivations relates to government policies: both China 
and Vietnam were and are experiencing transition. Both the Vietnamese and Chinese 
governments tried to attract more FDI to their countries. However, China was more 
successful in doing this and encouraging its own large MNEs to invest overseas. After 
China joined the WTO and set up a free trade agreement with ASEAN, the Chinese 
government believed “going outside” for Chinese MNEs was the best option for 
development. The governments in China and Vietnam played an important role in 
attracting, encouraging and providing FDI between the two countries. After nearly 30 
years of economic reform in China, the Chinese government decentralised a lot of 
authority to the management of SOEs.  As a result, some of these enterprises privatised, 
 
while some became public listed companies. However, the Chinese government still had 
a strong influence in the decision making of the Chinese MNEs through policies. The 
“Go outside” policy is a good example of this influence.  The Chinese government 
realised that overseas activity by their MNEs could increase their international 
competitiveness and improve their performance in their home economy. Regardless of 
whether the individual enterprises were ready to go outside or not, most were pushed to 
after the policy was implemented. Each policy of the government was treated like a 
campaign which the Chinese MNEs adopted and integrated into their decision making 
without due consideration. This phenomenon could also be called the MNEs with 
Chinese Socialist Characteristics Market Economy. Both CLFG and TCL experienced 
strong push factors to “go outside” from this policy. During an interview with both 
MNEs, they mentioned they had strong encouragement from the central and local 
government to invest in Vietnam. During the policy making process, the Chinese 
government not only took economic factors into account, but also factored political 
reasons into consideration. Encouraging Chinese MNEs to invest in Vietnam is a clear 
example of the government taking economic and political factors into account when 
forming policy.  
 
Since the Doi Moi policy was implemented in later 1980s, the Vietnamese 
government had tried repeatedly to attract FDI into the country. Vietnam not only saw the 
benefits of FDI in their “friend and comrade” China, in terms of domestic economic 
development and improvements in the people’s living standards, but experienced these 
benefits partially in the FDI they had attracted. The law for FDI had been amended four 
times since it was introduced in 1988. Fundamentally, the law protected the right for FDI 
in Vietnam. Meanwhile, the Vietnamese government made favourable policies for 
attracting FDI and competing with neighbouring countries such as Malaysia, Thailand 
and other ASEAN countries. CLFG was the first Chinese FDI project in Vietnam. The 
Vietnamese government provided a lot of encouragement for this project, as it was a 
symbolic project of the normalisation of the two countries diplomatic relationship. Due to 
the intense competition within Vietnam, different provinces had their own regulations 
and policies to attract FDI. Provinces such as Dong Nai set up a different industry zone 
and export processing zone for FDI, building infrastructure for the investment and 
reducing the bureaucracy from government. Evidence of the success of this policy is 
provided by the fact that both the Chinese MNEs located their FDI projects in Dong Nai 
province. TCL also had similar experiences in investing in Vietnam. In 1998, it was the 
hardest period for Vietnamese economic. The Asian Financial Crisis had a devastating 
impact on the local economy. FDI had declined from the pervious years and the 
government was very concerned about the economy. Several new policies were 
implemented to attract more investment into Vietnam. TCL benefited from these policies, 
said Dr. Yi Chun Yu. 
  
Similar cultural backgrounds, political systems and the bamboo network between 
China and Vietnam are another set of advantages accounting for why Chinese MNEs 
selected Vietnam as a FDI destination. China and Vietnam both were centrally planned 
economies. Both were and are in a transition from a planned economy to a market 
economy. Furthermore, both countries shared similar Confucian philosophies and cultural 
 
values. China was the first to adopt an open door policy in the late 1970s. 10 years later, 
Vietnam adopted a similar policy and opened up. In the period of economic transition, the 
Chinese MNEs gained experience at meeting the market demands of consumers, and in 
doing so, improved their marketing skills, technologies and management systems.  These 
propriety assets provided ownership advantages for Chinese MNEs when investing in 
Vietnam. In interviews with both companies, it was pointed out that this advantage made 
Vietnam a priority investment destination in Southeast Asia. They mentioned that they 
could easily understand the workings of the Vietnamese government system, local 
consumer behaviour, and didn’t experience difficulty in executing their marketing 
strategies. Dr. Yi from TCL mentioned that the past 10-15 years of market knowledge 
they had gained from the Chinese white good market could write a textbook for the 
Vietnamese market.  
 
Does the size of a company really matter for Chinese MNEs? Most Chinese 
MNEs believe in the globalised economic environment: “the larger, the better”. In the 
globalising economy, greater company size can be a crucial parameter, particular in an 
economy like China. Chinese MNEs believe that size itself can provide a sustainable 
competitive advantage for a company. It also has this protective function from its 
competitors. Both TCL and CLFG mentioned that large sized MNEs in different 
geographic locations can also collect and adopt new information and innovation for the 
company. CFLG and TCL are the largest companies in China. CFLG was one of the top 
500 trial-reformed SOEs in China in the 1980s. TCL was the fastest growing SOE.  Even 
though it was only founded in the 1980s, the achievement of TCL is remarkable. Now 
TCL is among the top 500 largest enterprises in China. Both companies have the strategic 
objective of sustaining and advancing their international competitiveness. To promote 
and implement this strategic objective, they select particular economies with the most 
promising investment potential. “The larger, the better” philosophy is another motivation 
driving Chinese MNEs to invest in Vietnam.  
 
Beyond those similarities, there are a couple of different motivations between 
TCL and CLFG. Different company backgrounds, management styles and products have 
resulted in different FDI motivations. The intensive market competition in China pushed 
TCL to escape from its home market. The Chinese home appliances industry has been 
growing really fast. From the 1980s to the 1990s, different Chinese brands and 
companies have emerged in China to intensify competition in this market. Companies 
operating in this market have used different marketing skills and strategies to target 
customers. Profit margins were low. This situation is similar with that of many developed 
economies and Newly Industrialised Economies (NIEs) that have experienced various 
stages of market competition in their economic development. By increasing exports of 
these products overseas, benefits were offset by growing trade barriers and tariffs in 
many countries, particularly in developing countries such as Vietnam. TCL believed that 
if the company wanted to achieve rapid growth again, it should find a new growing 
market. The high market competition from its home market pushed TCL to take the step 
into the international marketplace. Vietnam represents the start for TCL’s international 
strategy.   
 
 
An export-orientation is one of the motivations for China Luo Yang Floating 
Glass. CLFG set up its Vietnam subsidiary to secure and internalise their Vietnamese 
market. All the raw material for the subsidiary had to be imported from their head office 
in China. Regardless of whether the Vietnam subsidiary was profitable or not, the head 
office was still having to export the raw material to Vietnam. If the subsidiary was 
profitable, the revenue was considered a bonus. If not profitable, the head office would 
still make a profit from the manufacturing machines it had already sold to the Vietnam 
joint venture.  
 
5. Summary and Conclusions 
 
Seeking the Vietnamese domestic market, push and pull forces exerted by home and host 
government policies, similar political, cultural and economic systems, and the 
globalisation of companies are the common motives behind the Chinese MNEs 
investment in Vietnam. However, there are some different motivations between the two 
companies. For TCL, an intensely competitive home market and low profit margins 
pushed them out to seek other markets globally. Meanwhile, the going global strategy 
also made TCL regard Vietnam as a manufacturing base from which it could target the 
whole ASEAN market. Exporting more products to the Vietnamese market was one of 
the motivations for CLFG to set up its Vietnam subsidiary. 
 
          According to Dunning’s (1977, 1979) Eclectic paradigm Ownership advantage, 
Internalisation advantage and Location advantage are determinants of FDI. The two cases 
demonstrate that technology is not the only ownership advantages which CLFG and TCL 
had for their investment. The other intangible assets such as distribution knowledge, 
marketing skill, and their understanding of transitional economies are all ownership 
advantages for their investment. After 30 years of operating in a transitional economy, a 
lot of Chinese MNEs had rich experiences in knowing how to handle the transitional 
market, how to deal with customers during this period, how to set up distribution 
systems, and how to cope with intensive market competition. All of these intangible 
assets are comparative advantages for Chinese MNEs to invest in a similar, but behind, 
economy such as Vietnam. Like Dr. Yi from TCL said, the knowledge TCL gained from 
operating in the intensely competitive market of China in the early to late 1990s could 
write a textbook for the Vietnamese market. Vietnam is located in one of the most rapidly 
growing regions in the world. It has similar political and economic systems and a similar 
cultural background with China.  All of these factors attracted CLFG, TCL and other 
Chinese MNEs to invest in Vietnam. Both CLFG and TCL had ownership advantages. 
Therefore, it was more profitable for CLFG and TCL to internalise their advantages by 
extending their own activities, rather than externalising them by signing international 
contracts with independent companies. 
 
           The Eclectic paradigm of Dunning partially explained the motivation of Chinese 
MNEs investing in Vietnam. Some unique characteristics of Chinese MNEs in Vietnam 
seem missing. The role of the Chinese government and Chinese national policies seem to 
be ignored in this explanation. In fact, this factor is one of the most important motivations 
for Chinese MNEs to invest in Vietnam. National strategies and policies definitely had 
 
and have a strong influence on the corporate strategies of Chinese MNEs. Buckley (1998) 
pointed out government policies play an important part in fostering and hindering the 
preferred business strategies of firms 
 
Going global for Chinese MNEs is the outcome of China’s “Go outside” policy 
and open-door policy initiated after 1978. During the transition from a planned economy 
to a market economy, Chinese enterprises reformed their management, innovated their 
technologies and gained remarkable experience competing in an intensive marketplace. 
All of these factors became strengths of Chinese MNEs when engaging in investment 
activities overseas, particularly in other similar developing countries such as Vietnam. 
After China joined the WTO and signed the free trade agreement with ASEAN, the 
globalisation of Chinese MNEs in the region and worldwide has sped up. However, there 
are still limitations for the globalisation of Chinese MNEs. The Chinese government 
hasn’t established any legal infrastructure to protect the overseas investment of Chinese 
MNEs. There is also a lack of financial support and insurance services. The application 
procedure in China is still fairly complicated. Furthermore, Chinese MNEs themselves 
also have internal management problems, such as financial management problems of 
their overseas investment, human resource management problems etc. Chinese MNEs are 
still in the early stage of the globalisation process. From the experiences of other 
developed countries, Chinese MNEs should set up their overseas investment and 
management mechanisms, improve the quality of management by selecting qualified 
management teams, and provide training in areas such as human resources, marketing 
and foreign languages.  
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